To err is human. This statement is true for all activities where human beings are involved. If safety-critical work has to be performed-independent of the type of industry (aviation, nuclear or medicine)-certain structures and concepts have to be implemented to achieve a high level of safety. Table 1 shows the average mean time between failures (MTBFs) when different tasks have to be performed by human beings.
We learn from research work done by Professor Bubb of the Technical University of Munich that we have to expect an average of 15 work errors per person per working day. This is true only for a relaxed working atmosphere. If time pressure and stress increase, the MTBF decreases to one error every half minute. Most of the errors are identified immediately after they happen, but some remain undetected. We need special strategies to neutralize the errors, omissions and mistakes before they cause major problems.
A first and important step to reduce the number of errors is to structure the work process. The probability that important work steps are omitted or are done at the wrong time during a certain procedure has to be reduced. The easiest way to help the human operator is to use checklists. They help to identify and correct work errors and omissions before things go wrong or irreversible steps are taken in the wrong direction. As mentioned in Clark et al. [1] , checklists have to be tailored to the actual work situation. On the one hand, they have to be as precise and accurate as possible and, on the other hand, they should be as short and self-explanatory as possible. Checklists have to cover safety-critical working steps. Preparing a powerful and helpful checklist is a very difficult and demanding task. Therefore, checklists should be developed only by specialists and professionals who use them in their own work.
The use of checklists has to be taught and the procedures have to be updated whenever new information for the system's optimization becomes available. The use of a checklist has to be emphasized by the top management of an organization and the rules have to be observed by all members of a team. The team leader's adherence to the procedure is especially important.
In aviation, the obligatory use of checklists could increase the safety of a flight by more than a factor of 10.
Besides a well-structured working concept, which is 'protected' by checklists, there is another area which determines the risk of any operation where human performance is a factor: as shown in Santos et al. [2] , we have to deal with communication concepts.
A detailed investigation of the work environment combined with the analysis of the flight recorder data and the voice recording of cockpit communication provides a clear picture of the working conditions and the errors that lead to a catastrophe.
Accident statistics prove that it is the human being in the cockpit who causes approximately three-quarters of all aviation accidents. The large proportion of human error has given rise to the seemingly brilliant solution of replacing the fallible human being with an 'infallible' digitally operated computer. This measure was meant to eliminate all human insufficiencies from the man/machine control loop. A computer never gets tired, is not emotional, does not need a holiday and has a constant level of motivation, etc. A considerable share of human work has been taken over by robots. In many cases, this measure has an increased productivity and has guaranteed an unchanging product quality. In aviation, however, an increased degree of automation has not changed the share of human errors in causing the accidents. Even after the introduction of the so-called HITEC airplanes, the 'human error' factor still accounts for 75% of all accidents (Fig. 1) . Up to now, the assumption that an increased degree of automation will necessarily lead to an increase in safety has not been proven true.
However, if the computer is ruled out as the ultimate safety system, how else can complex operations involving quick and difficult decisions be controlled?
We must seek new answers in fields of activity that depend on the smoothest and safest possible interaction of a man and a machine. In this context, the findings of biology, psychology and the social sciences are gaining in importance.
OPTIMUM TEAM INTERACTION
To be able to optimally utilize the capacities of the human brain and to correct potential errors, we have to create operating structures that can identify and correct the possible errors. The interdisciplinary exchange of ideas and experience has shown that the optimal interaction of human(s) (team) and machine(s) in solving complex tasks under time pressure requires the use and observance of rules and standards that are applicable to all systems. In this context, it is of minor importance whether it is the operating procedures in an operating theatre or in the cockpit of an airplane are considered.
PARALLEL CONNECTION OF THOUGHT MACHINES
Since a single person is always 'highly error prone', the principle solution for the problem is to have him/her (besides using checklists) supported and controlled by a second person with the best possible and most suitable qualification.
The probability that two persons working independently of each other make exactly the same mistake at the same point within an operating process is relatively low. However, this is only true as long as the two thought machines collect and evaluate the available facts independently from each other before discussing and clarifying how to proceed (the parallel connection of several independent thought machines). In case they have different opinions, the reasons for a decision, as well as its advantages and disadvantages, must be discussed. The independent states of mind of those individuals influencing or controlling the process result in a safety network that is able to cushion human errors. The 'mesh size' is determined by the qualifications of the respective individuals and the quality of cooperation. Optimized communication is a key factor for the risk reduction.
HUMAN FACTOR RESEARCH PROJECT
The analysis of accident statistics is hindered by the-fortunatelylow number of catastrophes, which renders the formulation of valid statistical statements very difficult. References to the number of incidents that have actually occurred are often missing. A comprehensive survey is, therefore, indispensable to obtain an objective picture of the safety situation: a well-structured analysis of as many catastrophes as possible that 'almost occurred' visualizes the part of the 'incident iceberg' that is 'below the waterline'-i.e. outside the immediate access of the 'event analysts'. In addition, the question arises as to how large this normally invisible part is.
In order to get a better idea of situations that are potentially safety critical, the aviation industry has conducted the Human Factor Research Program. It is the most comprehensive study of its kind: 2070 pilots filled in a 120-page questionnaire. The survey asked for explanations and descriptions of the last safetycritical incident that had been experienced. The answers added up to 3 200 000 data records. Evaluation of the data took >2 years.
In contrast to a collection of reports on safety-critical incidents, the questionnaires did not, however, reveal how the event developed in detail (no scandalous stories), but only dealt with the possible influence and disturbance variables.
Based on the survey data, four main categories have been established, which cover the major aspects of the problems: The category OPS refers to influences complicating the operating procedure beyond the standard rate. SOC refers to the team situation in the cockpit: deficits in communication, bad crew resource management (CRM-a strategy for the optimal utilization of all resources and information that are available to a team), conflicts (which are quite often not openly expressed), a too steep or too flat hierarchy or psychological problems, etc.
For evaluation, the different risk categories were first considered separately, resulting in the following percentages (reflected as a percentage of the total number of incidents):
(i) TEC: 7.7% (ii) HUM: 4.9% (iii) OPS: 1.2% (iv) SOC: 0.7% It shows that, when considering individual incidences, TEC are at the top of the scale with 7.7% of all events, followed by HUM with 4.9%. At first sight, this is surprising: how does this figure relate to the fact that 75% of all accidents worldwide are due to human beings? The analysis shows that cockpit crews are normally well able to manage one single error. The safety network of structured cockpit work eases solitary human errors.
THE EFFECT OF SIMULTANEOUSLY OCCURRING RISK FACTORS
In a second step, the analysis comes closer to the actual risk potential: now two categories are combined, respectively (e.g. TEC + HUM or OPS + SOC, etc.). Here, we see that the dangerous 
SOCIAL FACTORS-A 'TURBO FACTOR' WITH REGARD TO HUMAN ERROR
The next evaluation step gives an answer to this question: when considering combinations of three risk factors (e.g. TEC + OPS + SOC), the following picture develops: by far the most frequent safety-critical situation (37.8% of all events) arises from the following 'mixture':
(ii) In this situation of increased stress, a human error occurs (HUM). (iii) The negative effects of the error cannot be corrected or eased because the working climate and team interaction (SOC) is not optimal.
This means that a poor team structure may have the effect of a 'turbo-charger' when a human error occurs: in many cases, it takes tense human relations to turn a 'harmless' error into a potentially life-threatening situation. It should be pointed out that a tense atmosphere is usually not identical to a dispute. In many cases, the working climate is burdened without the awareness of the person responsible. The others involved in the situation frequently only sense an 'undefined feeling of unease'. A first negative impression, too much or too little respect, contempt, misunderstandings, a bad mood brought from the home, a lack of motivation, etc. can considerably reduce the efficiency of a team. A first and important step to ease the problem is to clearly express one's own personal feeling of unease. Normally, a considerable inner reluctance first needs to be overcome to be able to do this. Statements such as: ' … I do not feel comfortable in our teamwork' or ' … I have the feeling that there are problems nobody addresses' can be a first step to improve cooperation.
Particularly in professions characterized by the image of brilliant experts solving their problems without difficulties, it may be a real challenge to address soft 'psycho-social factors'. Nevertheless, this area must not be neglected or repressed, for this risk potential was not discovered, articulated and brought to light by 'worldly innocent' psychologists, but by those responsible for the problems.
WORKING CLIMATE AND SAFETY
Everybody knows that a working atmosphere has an influence on quality of work and on safety. It is, however, definitely surprising that the impact of 'atmospheric disturbances' is so high. According to the above findings, the fact that colleagues do not get along well with each other ranks highest on the scale of safety problems. Social tensions in the team increase the risk of a safety-critical incident by the factor of 5, or in other words:
An optimal working atmosphere could mitigate or ease 80% of all safety-critical human errors.
The study has thus proven a quantitative connection between the 'soft factor', social climate, and the risk of dangerous incidents. However, not only do the number of incidents increases, but also the severity of an event!
TRAINING FOR OPTIMIZED TEAMWORK
What does this statement imply for our work organization and for training?
The efforts to achieve an optimal CRM and optimal team structures must be intensified. This implies that deficits in the team behavior must be addressed consequently by individual colleagues as well as by trainers and superiors. Clearly, social competence is also important for managing safety problems in technically oriented fields of work-a fact that has been seriously underestimated in the past. Figure 2 shows the percentages for the individual risk groups. The figure reveals that the survey made it possible to break down the fine structure of the safety-relevant human factors: when adding up all categories in which the factor HUMAN (HUM) appears, the total is 79.1%, and this figure corresponds more or less to the 75% reported by IATA accident statistics.
THE VARIOUS RISK CATEGORIES

FREQUENCY OF EVENT CONFIGURATIONS
But what does the term SOC mean if one examines it more closely? The structure of the questionnaire deliberately addressed possible impairments: Fig. 2 shows that the factor SOC is found at the bottom of the table with 0.7%. This clearly states that social problems-as an isolated factor-are practically irrelevant as the cause of a safety-critical event. Great efforts are being made to create a positive working atmosphere. Existing difficulties only become obvious, when additional burdening factors are present.
COMMUNICATION DEFICITS
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the problems assigned to the field of SOC.
In 68.4% of all events described, 'additional aggravating factors in the field of social interaction' were found. As mentioned previously, this very rarely refers to a common dispute or an openly fought conflict. In 77.4% of cases with aggravating factors in the area of social interaction, communication problems were reported.
In 48% of all incidents (Fig. 3 ):
(i) necessary statements were not made, corresponding hints were not given; (ii) unclear concerns were not expressed; and (iii) important statements were incomplete, insufficient or were not heard.
In the above cases, the 'sender' of the message was the one who was negligent, since the quality of communication is entirely determined by whatever arrives at the other end. For this reason, the sender of the message is obliged to check what information has actually been perceived by the receiver.
So, the problem is not the captain's reluctance to put a hint received into action, but the lack of courage of the first officer to address deviations consequently and clearly.
In only 23% of all communication problems, no corresponding reaction followed a clearly understood hint. But there is a strategy to deal with this type of situation too: if there is no reaction to a corrective hint, the concern must be repeated.
If the first officer does not speak up and the captain is exclusively fixed on the target, this can result in the non-correction of an error (Fig. 4) . The worst accident in civil aviation, with 583 casualties, happened because a young co-pilot did not have the courage to correct the experienced trainer captain for a second time.
COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY AS A 'TEACHER' OF HUMAN INTERACTION
The expectation that a high level of technology will render the technical knowledge of the machine operator and the common 
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sense of man superfluous to a large extent has not been fulfilled. It is almost paradoxical that man's efforts to develop machines that compensate for human weaknesses have lead to the situation where the 'inherently human' abilities of social competence, optimal teamwork and communication are now especially critical when dealing with high-tech devices.
